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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                        WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
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                           SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
     EVA MARISOL DUNCAN,
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      Plaintiff,
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                                  S
                                  S CIVIL ACTION NO: 5:14CV912-FB
     V.
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     JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., § April 27, 2016
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      DEFENDANT.
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                     TRANSCRIPT OF FAIRNESS HEARING
                  BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN W. PRIMOMO
                         MAGISTRATE COURT JUDGE
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     APPEARANCES:
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     For the Plaintiff:
                              BENJAMIN R. BINGHAM
                              Bingham & Lea, P.C.
                              319 Maverick Street
14
                              San Antonio, TX 78212
15
                              CHARLES ANTHONY RILEY
                              Riley & Riley, Attorneys at Law
16
                              320 Lexington Avenue
                              San Antonio, TX 78215-1913
17
18
                              CHARLES DARBY RILEY
                              Attorney at Law
19
                              320 Lexington Avenue
                              San Antonio, TX 78215
2.0
                              H. ANTHONY HERVOL
21
                              Law Office of H. Anthony Hervol
                              4414 Centerview Drive
2.2
                              Suite 200
                              San Antonio, TX 78228
23
2.4
     Produced by mechanical stenography; computer-aided
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     transcription
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Leticia Ornelas Rangel, CSR

l.			
1	APPEARANCES CONTINUED:		
2	For the Def		NOAH A. LEVINE Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLC
3			250 Greenwich Street New York, NY 10007
4 5	WILLIAM LANCE LEWIS Quilling Selander Lownds Winslett & Moser, PC		
6	2001 Bryan St., Suite 1800 Dallas, TX 75201		
7			
8			
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	Leticia Ornelas Rangel, CSR		

## P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 1 2 THE COURT SECURITY OFFICER: All rise. 3 THE COURT: Please be seated. The case before the Court is Eva Marisol Duncan v. JPMorgan Chase Bank et al. 4 And I'll ask for announcement from counsel for the plaintiff 5 and then for the defendant. 6 7 MR. BINGHAM: Good morning, Your Honor, Ben Bingham for the Plaintiff and the Class. 8 9 MR. HERVOL: Morning, Your Honor, Tony Hervol for 10 the Plaintiff and the Class. MR. RILEY: Your Honor, Darby Riley for the 11 Plaintiff and the Class. 12 13 MR. RILEY: And I'm Charles Riley also for the Plaintiff and the Class. 14 15 THE COURT: On behalf of the defendant? MR. LEWIS: Lance Lewis on behalf of defendant 16 17 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.. MR. LEVINE: And Noah Levine, Your Honor, on behalf 18 19 of the defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.. 20 THE COURT: Okay. And I understand there are some 21 individuals who are here who are going to be objecting to the settlement, and I will be asking you for your names and 22 23 comments later in this hearing. The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether or not the settlement is fair, 2.4 2.5 whether the notice of the settlement and the settlement are

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fair, reasonable, and adequate, and including whether or not the plaintiff's request for attorney's fees is a reasonable request. And there's also the matter of a service payment to the class representative. And the Court will also consider any timely filed objections to the settlement.

The Class was certified regarding a -- I believe it was a -- I don't have the specific notification or Class in front of the -- involved. I think it involved allegations that JP Morgan Chase bank was looking at accounts of individuals who no longer had active accounts at their bank. And there's some question as to the validity of that. And I think the parties -- this lawsuit was filed in October 2014 or thereabouts, and the parties eventually reached a settlement. And as in any Class action settlement, it has to be something that is approved by the Court after notification is provided to the parties, to all the potential Class members. Class notice was approved by the Court back in December. I think Class notices were sent out. they, the Class members -- and I think there was somewhat over 2 million potential Class members. I think somewhat over 400,000 Class members responded by the deadline in Some opted in. Some filed claims. Some opted out. March. And then some individuals have objected to the settlement in writing. Some of those individuals will not be here today, but their objections will still be considered by the Court.

And any individual who objects to this settlement who are here today will have the opportunity to put their objections on the record.

The first matter that the Court must consider is —concerns the adequacy of the Court notice. I don't recall that anyone objected to the adequacy of the notice of the settlement. Mr. Bingham, Mr. Lewis, are you aware that anyone objected either in writing or otherwise to the adequacy of the settlement notice?

MR. BINGHAM: No, Your Honor, you're correct. No one objected.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Lewis?

MR. LEWIS: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Then I think we'll get into the matter of the Fairness of the Settlement. I think a motion to approve the settlement has been filed, and I really can't recall now if that was filed by the -- by both parties or just by the plaintiff.

MR. BINGHAM: Just by the plaintiff, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. If you would, Mr. Bingham, don't go into a long dissertation about the -- you know, everything in that motion. But state on the record why you believe the settlement is fair to the Class members in this case.

MR. BINGHAM: Your Honor, I have copies of the actual motion and the exhibits, if that would be helpful.

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I don't need that.
               THE COURT: I have that.
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               MR. BINGHAM: All right.
                                         Thank you.
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               The settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable
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     for several reasons: First, it requires Chase to provide
     annual audits of its--.
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               THE COURT: If you could, again, state for the
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     record -- I bumbled through stating exactly what the problem
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     was and what the Class consists of. If you could be more
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     specific about that for the people who are here.
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               MR. BINGHAM:
                            Sure. The Class consists of people
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     who no longer have an account with Chase, people who have
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     either paid their accounts, been foreclosed on, and don't owe
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     any money after the foreclosure, have discharged their
    personal liability and bankruptcy, and then there's a few
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     other short-sale transactions and things like that. So it's
     basically people who fell on hard times that is primarily due
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     to the mortgage crisis, either lost their homes or would go
    bankruptcy and discharge their personal liability. Some are
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     still in their homes. But the thing they have in common is
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     they don't owe Chase any money. The other thing they have in
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     common is they're very --
               THE COURT: Did all these people -- all these
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     accounts are people who owed money to Chase?
               MR. BINGHAM: Yes, they're all former customers.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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MR. BINGHAM: At one time they did owe money to
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     Chase.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
               MR. BINGHAM: And now they don't.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
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               MR. BINGHAM:
                             They're all former customers.
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 7
     they're all people, too, that are trying to rebuild their
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     credit, so what's in their credit report is very important to
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     them. Credit reports are very complex. I don't know if
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     you've looked at yours lately, but they're hard to decipher.
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               THE COURT: No, I'm afraid to.
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               MR. BINGHAM: So these are people that are trying
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     to put it all back together. And Mrs. Duncan is a good
     example, Your Honor, she is here today.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
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               MR. BINGHAM: She actually had her house foreclosed
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     on when her understanding was that it wouldn't be foreclosed
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         Litigation ensued, and she actually repurchased the
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    house for full -- paid off Chase completely. So she was a
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     former Chase customer who didn't owe Chase any money. And
     she is in the industry. She assists people with financing
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     their manufactured homes. So she can read her credit record.
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               THE COURT: Could you pull that microphone a little
    bit closer to you?
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                             Sure.
               MR. BINGHAM:
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THE COURT: Thank you, sir.
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               MR. BINGHAM:
                             She is in the industry, so she could
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     recognize that Chase was continuing to access her credit
     report after she did not owe Chase any money. Now,
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 5
     technically, there's not damages to people by what we call
     soft pulls.
                 These are transactions where Chase looks at the
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 7
     former customers' credit report. But nobody else can see it,
     and it doesn't affect the credit score. That's called a soft
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 9
    pull in the industry.
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               THE COURT: What's the purpose of doing that?
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               MR. BINGHAM: Well, we say none. We say absolutely
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           Because there's no -- there would be no reason to do
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     that, in our mind. And that's what the lawsuit is all about.
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               THE COURT:
                           They must do it for some reason.
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               MR. BINGHAM: Well, I think--.
               THE COURT: I don't want to stir things up.
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               MR. BINGHAM: No.
               THE COURT: I would just like some understanding of
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     it.
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               MR. BINGHAM: Well, I think the real reason is they
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     intend not to. Their systems are designed not to do that.
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    But because they have so many customers in so many different
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     situations, they have loan packages acquired from other
     lenders, the software may not integrate. Their algorithms
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may not integrate. It's a complex computer kind of problem

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that Mr. Hervol is better equipped to talk about. But it's generally not for a purpose of trying to collect a debt because it's not owed, it's been discharged. It's generally not for the purpose of selling the account because the account balance is zero. There have been some — in other cases, there's been some arguments made about a legitimate purpose to pull these. But in our view there is none. There's absolutely no reason.

THE COURT: Do you believe that that's one of the reasons it might make proof of willfulness difficult?

MR. BINGHAM: That certainly is. And that's why we think this case is a little unique, though, because in our mind the willfulness is the failure to audit because their own system shows that they're not supposed to be doing that, but nobody is checking the system to see if the system is working. That's where we say the willfulness is, not in, you know, I can't imagine a reason why a creditor would willfully and intentionally go out and pull one on a closed account, unless perhaps sell the information to someone else. But I mean, the information that's in your credit report is pretty readily available.

But that's -- that brings up another point. What's in your contract report, and these people are trying to rebuild their credit, and they have got basically a former creditor or a stranger pulling their credit report that has

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their name, their former names, all their addresses, their social security numbers, every account they've ever had. All that stuff is in the credit record. So these people are sensitive about somebody looking in. The example we used in discovery is, to the witness, let me see what's in your wallet. And it's even worse than that. It's worse than looking at somebody's wallet without a purpose, because there's more information on the credit report than there is in your wallet. But it's the same kind of thing. It's not -- you're not damaged in a legal sense because someone picks up your wallet and starts thumbing through it. But it's highly offensive, and you don't want it to happen. You want to protect your private information. So that's what the case is about.

And in the briefing you will see this is the second time a case has been brought against Chase. The first case was actually prosecuted by Mr. Hervol, and it was Chase's credit card unit. This is mostly mortgages in this case. But the credit card unit was in a Class action here in the Western District that settled in 2009. So, legally, we say that helps our willfulness argument. But we still have a lot of hurdles to overcome to get there. The law which we've briefed out is that it's not Chase's behavior that's at issue, it's whether their behavior is objectively unreasonable in their interpretation of the Fair Credit

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Reporting Act as it affects these count reviews. And the Supreme Court when addressing willfulness says: To determine willfulness you look for this objective behavior, and you look for circuit court authority or regulatory authority. don't have either of those in this case that is helpful to the plaintiff. The only circuit court authority says: Fair Credit Reporting Act is ambiguous as to whether a creditor can or cannot pull a closed account. So the only circuit authority is against us on that point. And the same case, the Levine case, says that it -- even if they -- their interpretation was correct, the willfulness standard would be lacking because there's no authoritative guidance. And the interpretation by the creditor, if it's ambiguous, how can you hold him willful. That's basically what it comes down If the statute is ambiguous, you can't find the creditor willfully violated it.

Our argument is, that's fine for that case, but in this case you have the same creditor doing the same thing a second time. The Court has to look at the subjective in -- procedures, I guess, as part of the willfulness inquiry. We think we probably will lose at the trial court level and have to go to the Fifth Circuit on that just because the law is what it is, and we've briefed that out. But that's why we took the case. We just couldn't believe that common sense would be entirely lacking even in the FCRA cases. So that's

what the case is about.

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Mr. Hervol and I have done three or four or five of these type of cases. I was originally in the Sleezer case.

We've done American Express. We've done United San Antonio
Federal Credit Union. Maybe that's it. I can't remember.

So we're familiar with the -- how to get the discovery we need and how to formulate the information that we need. All but one of those cases has settled. One case we lost at the certification. We didn't get it certified, I guess the

American Express. But we've got some good experience and so we know what we're doing and we know what to look for, and we know how to recognize a case, which this is kind off going off in different directions, but our expert is here, Evan Hendricks.

And one of the things he talks about is the education and value of the settlement in itself because the notice did go out and we got about 2.1 million notices went out, and we reached a 94 percent, what they call re-trade. We believe that 94 percent of the Class members actually received the notice. And so even if they didn't file a claim, they got notice of what the lawsuit was about and that there was a contention that this account was used on a closed account, was a claim that they could do something about. And we've just been inundated with calls from the Class members, and a lot of people are just saying, I didn't know it was a

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claim. I saw that they were pulling it. But I didn't know it was anything. And I didn't know I could do anything about it. Thank you. We got a lot of calls like that so.

Anyway, so the settlement the -- is fair, reasonable, and adequate because what we did get is this audit procedure whereby Chase will implement procedures for three years to conduct audits to make sure that it's not pulling the credit reports of people who have closed accounts. And those accounts include the same definition that is in our Class definition. So we think we're going to get the process stopped.

Our expert calls that a landmark change and calls it an important change. And the reason he does — one of the objectors said something, well, the injunctive relief has no value because that's what Chase is supposed to do anyway.

Maybe so, but Chase isn't doing it. Chase has no legal obligation to conduct these audits. But now it's agreed to. And that has value to the Class members because they're no longer going to sue Chase for pulling their credit reports. In fact, we've seen that since the case has been pending.

Mr. Hervol does bankruptcy law, and as far as that he pulls the credit reports of clients and potential clients. So we're looking at it, and it appears the process has stopped.

So that's a benefit to the Class members.

The educational benefit I briefly mentioned, that's

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a real thing too. We believe from literally between the three firms, thousands of calls from Class members and probably less than five complaining about anything. I mean, people are understanding the notice. They're thankful. Our phone numbers are not even on the Class notice. They have to hunt us down to call us. There's no toll free number to the lawyers. There is to the settlement administration. People are hunting us down to say thank you. So that's a part of the reason the settlement is fair. It brings value to the Class members regardless of whether they filed a claim. That value extends to all the Class members, to the general public as well.

But for those who file a claim, and there were 400, we just reached 473,000 people filing the claims. For those who filed it, they share pro rata in this \$8.75 million fund that Chase has agreed to put up. The settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable because 8.75 million is only the second common fund in these type of cases. And there's probably maybe a dozen reported cases. It's only the second common fund. The other common fund was approved in the settlement by Judge Nolack, that's United King v. United Federal Savings or Federal Credit Union. That fund was 500,000. So this one is 8.75 million. So it's by far the largest fund. It's only the second common fund in this type of case. It's only the second one that provides actual money

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to people versus coupon-type of things. And most of the other settlements have, you know, like credit monitoring or a free credit report or a free credit score or something like that. That's kind of what the relief is. But the response rate on those cases is miserable.

There's that chart we brought today, and it's in our briefing also, that just compares this case to these other similar cases. In that Sleezer case there were two claims. It offered credit monitoring. And most of those cases, it's just a dismal response rate from the client -- from the Class. We've -- in our briefing, we've gone through -- there's not that many FCRA cases, but there are cases under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, which are just rampant right now. And that claim rate, the participation rate of the Class members in those cases is averaging between 5 and 6 percent. In this case, we have 22-plus-percent of the people actually filing the claims, which is unheard of in this business.

One of the judges in Chicago had the Class counsel go survey cases from all over the -- well, from four circuits I believe to try to identify the claim rate in TCPA cases. There was one case that hit 19 percent. And I have got a list of those, if you would like to look at it. One case hit 19 percent, two or three went over ten. Some of them were less than a percent. But the average was 5.4 percent of the

people participating. We've got just an unheard of claim rate in this case. And it's because people get it and they're interested. And it's also because part of our notice, the notice was a claim form, and I brought a copy here, if you need to see that. But it was a claim form that was double-sided, folded over, and it's all the person had to do was read it, sign their name, update their address, certify that they wanted the funds, and mail it back. And the mailing was postage prepaid. So it didn't even cost them the stamp to mail it back.

We made it as easy as possible to participate in this case because we didn't want to get stuck with a case where, you know, 5 percent of the people had responded. So as a result of good notice and understandable notice, we got this huge claim rate, which is one of the factors the Courts look at to decide is this a fair, reasonable, and adequate settlement. We have got a huge participation rate. We have as of today I think 181 people who have opted out. And I'm a lawyer because I can't do math, but that's less than — that's a fraction of one percent. 181 out of 2.1 million have opted out of the settlement. And from conversations with Class members, I can tell you that a lot of those people are people who went through bankruptcy, got a discharge, but remained in the house. And they didn't want to take any risk with Chase by filing a claim. They thought if they filed a

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claim, Chase might kick them out of the house or something like that. We told them, no, but at the same time I can tell you they considered that a part of the risk, and that's part of the reason they opted out of the settlement.

We have -- we're down to two attorney objections out of 2.1 million people. Well, that's a factor the Courts look at. Is the settlement fair. We have two objections both of -- it's all briefed out, both from professional objectors. These are guys who object in every settlement they can. It's boilerplate objections. There's not a single fact in either one of those objections. They -- Mr. Cox is here. Mr. Bamus didn't show up. If the Court approves the settlement, they will file a notice of appeal, and they will ask us to pay part of our attorney's fees as part of the -- I call it extortion, to get rid of the appeal and get the settlement administration underway. In other words, nobody in the Class gets anything until these two guys get their money. That's what's going on here.

We have -- there's one other group from Chicago that we filed a motion to strike the objection because Marlin Paul had not filed a claim. The Court granted that. Her significant other is an 80 year-old lawyer who has contacted us, contacted defense counsel, has another buddy who is a lawyer, who has contacted defense counsel. We thought that they might be here today. They said they had mailed in a pro

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hac motion ten days ago now. So we don't know what their status is, but we would ask that the Court, when reviewing the objections just review the Marlin Paul objection too because it's really no different than the others and just consider that and overrule that.

THE COURT: Let me get back to some of the factors, though, that you dealt on most of them. But one of the them is the complexity, expense, and likely duration of litigation as well as the state of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed because I do recall reading that someone thought that this was a rush to settlement. And if you address that matter.

MR. BINGHAM: Sure. Well, I'll say yes and no. It was a rush -- we filed the case. We got the order to consider at least ABR pretty early in the case. We agreed to mediate the case. And before the mediation, the Supreme Court accepted a writ of certiorari in this case called Robins v. Spokeo -- or Spokeo. People say it different ways. But that case would impact whether Mrs. Duncan had standing to pursue this claim because the issue there is whether a person without actual concrete injury has standing to pursue an FCRA claim. Mrs. Duncan doesn't have that kind of injury, although we could allege it, if we had to. But in general, because these are soft pulls not seen by anybody, don't affect your credit scores, people don't have damages.

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So the Supreme Court had once before in a case called First American, maybe three or four years ago, accepted cert. on this same issue. And then they dismissed it saying that the certiorari was improvidently granted. So when Spokeo came up and they accepted cert. again, all the plaintiffs bar thought, okay, they're going to rule that if -- because all you can allege is a violation, you don't have standing. And courts have bought that. FCRA cases cited in our brief have been stayed pending that decision.

TCPA cases have been stayed pending that decision. All kinds of statutory causes of action have been stayed -- FTCPA cases have been stayed all because of the standing issue.

So, yeah, we wanted to get a settlement before the decision came out in *Spokeo*, but that doesn't mean that we just layed down and said, hey, you know, whatever you give us we'll take. We had a hard-fraught mediation preceded by extensive briefing. All the cases are in our briefing, but basically from the plaintiff's point of view, in the universe of this type of case there's one case where a court in a single individual action has found a violation that was willful. But in that case the defendant didn't even challenge the violation, so it's not — it doesn't give us much hope.

The Fifth Circuit has ruled that because the FCRA is ambiguous as to whether a creditor can pull on a closed

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account, there can't be a willful violation. That case is cited in our briefing. The Eleventh Circuit has ruled the same way. There's a couple other cases that deal with bankruptcy folks. Bankruptcy discharges a person's personal liability to repay the debt. But the Court says, yeah, but they still had a house. So the creditor has this -- don't ask me how -- what the reason is. But the court says -- the creditor still -- there's still a creditor relationship because there's still collateral. And so the creditor still has the permissible purpose to pull the former borrower's credit report.

So it's against that backdrop that we're negotiating with Chase, and then also the *Spokeo* case comes down. We all brief it out extensively. We go to San Francisco and mediate with Judge Edward Infante, who is a former magistrate judge that kind of specializes in these statutory cases. He's done some of the biggest and probably most of the biggest cases. We mediate with him. We reach a settlement in principal. There's still some due diligence to do. But this is — we did serve discovery. Chase did answer the discovery. The fact that Chase was doing these pulls was never contested. They admitted that. So it really turns into a legal argument and Class identification and process. And I've been doing this 15 plus years. In the big cases with good lawyers they're usually not resolved with a bunch

of discovery battles. Responsible lawyers give you what you want. You talk about it. It's almost like problem-solving type of deal. And it's happened in several different kinds of cases, but you don't -- there's not a bunch of discovery battles. They gave us what we wanted. We didn't have to make formal requests. We did our due diligence. If there was something that came out, we would say, hey, how about this. We would have a conference call or they would produce documents. It was the way it was supposed to be. And we've -- this isn't our first case. So we know when we've got enough money -- or enough information, actually, both, to settle a case.

So and that -- and I wouldn't say the negotiations change much after a mediation, but the due diligence continued. The questions went back and forth because we didn't have everything we needed. We needed to verify things. We took a deposition of a Chase officer to verify things. But, you know, that's what we're supposed to do, and we did it. So, you know, everything is relative. Was it early compared to some other cases? Yes. Was it uninformed?

No. Is it fair? Yes. It's the biggest of this type of case ever. It's hard to say it's unfair when you look at the other similar cases. It's just head and shoulders above.

THE COURT: Anything else on the settlement itself?

MR. BINGHAM: I think -- you know what, I talked

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about the injunctive relief on our procedures. Record date
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     breaking settlement -- record-breaking participation rate.
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     think that's all I have on the settlement.
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               THE COURT: On the matter of attorney's fees,
     counsel is asking for a third?
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                            That's right, Your Honor.
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               MR. BINGHAM:
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               THE COURT: Okay. And why would you not -- I
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     understand that in this circuit the Court of Appeals tends to
    prefer the Lodestar.
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               MR. BINGHAM:
                             Well.
               THE COURT: Is that or is that not true?
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               MR. BINGHAM: I think that's not true anymore.
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               THE COURT: Since when?
               MR. BINGHAM: Since the Dell case in 2012. It's
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     cited in our briefing. In a common fund case, let me qualify
     that, where a common fund has been created, I don't think
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     since the Dell case came out.
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               THE COURT: What's the name of the case?
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               MR. BINGHAM: It's called Union Asset Management v.
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    Dell, 699 F.3d 632. That's a Fifth Circuit case from 2012.
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    And the Court there says that they don't disapprove of the
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                They say the Court can still choose. But they do
    Lodestar.
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     say that they are joining the other circuits, majority of
    other circuits I think is what they say, in allowing the
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    district court the discretion to use a percentage of the
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funds in common-fund cases. And since Dell came out, I can't think of a case where in a common fund, where a Court had not used percentage of the fund. The Dell case also suggests that a 25 percent should be kind of the benchmark but almost — with the exception of one case, every case is used — 33 either, either 33 percent plus expenses or 33 percent including the expenses. We're in the second group. We're saying 33 including expenses, but I think there's only one case that's not done a third since 2012.
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The one case that didn't do it was a data-breach type of case where hackers had got into the Heartland Payment System's payment processing systems data. It was a coupon-type settlement, and the Court valued the actual Class relief at like \$1600. And that Court still awarded 20 -- there was injunctive relief there that the Court valued. The Court -- the total value of the fund was somewhere 1-3, 1-4 million. And the Court awarded 20 percent of that amount as the fee. Every other case -- but most of them are from Louisiana. I'll have to admit that. But every other case has been a third plus expenses or a third including expenses. But, you know, that's up to you. And some of the objectors say that's too much, you know.

THE COURT: Have you kept track -- have all the attorneys kept track of their hours?

MR. BINGHAM: Yes, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: And what would -- what percentage of
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     the total settlement would it be if we applied the Lodestar?
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     Have you figured that out?
               MR. BINGHAM: Well, I could do it easily, we have
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     right as of today, we have 18 -- say, 1820 hours right now.
     1819.55, and that's through I think yesterday. And then we
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     have 20, 23,196 in expenses. And so I think that comes up to
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     somewhere around 855,000 in actual time on the books as of
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     yesterday. But the case is not over. We have two objectors
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     who are notorious for filing notice of appeal.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Just stay with me.
                                                      And I know
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     it could go up. As of today, what is the percentage of the
     8.75 million that you have in attorney's fees and expenses?
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               MR. BINGHAM: It's going to be approximately
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     12 percent -- 13 percent.
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               THE COURT: So you're asking the Court to approve
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     going from about 12 percent, according to the Lodestar, up to
        That's a significant -- a highly significant increase.
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               MR. BINGHAM: It's -- it's obviously an increase.
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    But it's not unjustified under the current case law because.
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               THE COURT: It's not a matter -- I know. But what
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    you told me, you told me what -- that there was no dispute.
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     That they did what they did.
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               MR. BINGHAM: Correct.
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               THE COURT: And you told me that there was somewhat
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of a rush to settle the case because of the Supreme Court case.

MR. BINGHAM: Right. Because otherwise we would get nothing.
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THE COURT: I think out of an abundance of fairness, 33 percent is an extremely high number to be asking for.

MR. BINGHAM: Well, as I say, the Court is going to do what it's going to do.

THE COURT: Well, it's not a matter of what I'm -- I'm not doing anything. I will recommend to Judge Biery.

That's all I do.

MR. BINGHAM: Right, right.

THE COURT: And for those of you who may not be aware of that, I am just a magistrate judge. I recommend to Judge Biery. Judge Biery makes the final determination. If you go from a 12 percent Lodestar and higher depending upon what else has to be done, to a 33 percent attorney's fees, is a significant jump in any judge's mind. And I think the attorneys should have thought that out before they made that request.

MR. BINGHAM: Well, we have. And I think as part of our declarations you will see what we project we will have at the end, and that the multiplier will be I think at that time we said like 3.1. It's going to be under a three

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multiplier, which is commonly approved in this circuit. And we also have the injunctive relief. There's some value to the injunctive relief. Our expert has put one dollar per Class member on the educational value. We can't get more conservative than that. On the audit procedures he has put \$5, which covers a three-year period. So, you know, you're talking a couple of bucks a year. That's extremely conservative.

In these FCRA cases, injunctive relief is huge. We've changed a practice. And in the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit recently approved a case, Berry v. Lexis Nexus, it's cited in our stuff, where the relief was injunctive relief. And the Court awarded 5.2 million in attorney's fees. There's value to these injunctions. So when we add in the value of the injunction plus the common fund, we say, one third of the common fund amount is the same as 13 percent of the value of the case. And every case in the Fifth Circuit places a value on the injunctive relief. So, yes, if you're only looking at that component, and if you're only looking at the fact that where we are today versus we know we're going to have an appeal. We know we're going to have a bond motion. We know we're going to have a motion in the Fifth Circuit for summary affirmance if the settlement is approved. We know that because the way the settlement is structured, even after everything is done,

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we're still in the case for like eight months. We are going
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     to have Class member calls like you can't believe because
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     we've had them. I've never experienced anything like this.
     We're going to have so many calls, but, you know, when are we
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     getting our checks? What's the status of the appeal? It's
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     just going to go on and on. Those things are real, and
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 7
     they're going to happen. And so if you take a snapshot right
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     now, they're entirely correct. But I would suggest that
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     there's a lot more work to go and that as a common fund every
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     single court has done percentage of the fund.
               THE COURT: Have you computed -- that's -- let's
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12
     assume if you got 33 percent, how much -- and let's assume
13
     that everyone that has filed a claim gets their money after
14
     the 33 percent. What would each claim member get?
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               MR. BINGHAM: Right now -- and this is pretty
     accurate, $6.17.
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               THE COURT: That's it?
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               MR. BINGHAM: That's more than any other cases of
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     this type has paid. But that's it.
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               THE COURT: I'm not asking if it's more than any
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     other case.
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               MR. BINGHAM: No, that's it. That's it. May I
     explain where that number comes from?
23
2.4
               THE COURT: I just assume that you took a third out
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     of 8.75 million, then divide it by 411,000.
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MR. BINGHAM:
                             Or 73.
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               THE COURT: Into the remainder.
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               MR. BINGHAM:
                             Right.
               THE COURT: Is that not accurate?
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                             That's accurate. But I don't think
               MR. BINGHAM:
     you can ignore the fact that we have 473,000, a 22 percent
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     claim rate, which is -- you know, it's four or five times
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    more than any other case. The reason the amount is smaller
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     is because we have such extraordinary claim rates. And even
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     though the amount is $6, it compares favorably with these
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     TCPA cases that are getting approved all over the country.
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     And under the TCPA, Telephone Consumer Protection Act, it's
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     strict liability. You get 500 bucks if you get a call to
     your cell phone that you didn't consent to. Those cases are
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     settling for -- most of them are in the right around $30 on a
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     $500 claim. That's the same as $6 on a $100 claim. So it's
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     in the range of reasonableness. It's more than anybody else.
     It's driven by the fact that we made it easy to file claims.
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     You know, we could have done a lot of things to stop the
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     claim rate. We didn't want to do that. We want
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     participation. You know, the big factor seems to be that we
    paid for the return postage on the postcards because I
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     compared another -- .
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               THE COURT: I'm not criticizing. Everything you
2.5
    have done -- I'm not saying you did anything wrong.
                                                           I'm just
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asking what they're going to come up with, which is decreased
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     by the amount of attorney's fees that you are asking for.
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               MR. BINGHAM: No, there's no question about that.
               THE COURT: Okay.
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               MR. BINGHAM:
                            But everybody knew it. In our notice
     it says one third fees, and we got two objectors. You know,
6
 7
     everybody knew it. It's consistent with what attorneys
     charge all the time in contingency cases. And so, you know.
 8
 9
               THE COURT: Well, but generally --
10
               (Cross-talking.)
               MR. BINGHAM: It's not unfair.
11
               THE COURT: Generally, there's one client that gets
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13
     the other two thirds. In this case, it's being split among
     400 and some-odd thousand people who get a check for $6.17
14
15
     that won't buy them a big Mac.
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               MR. BINGHAM: Well, but the example we use is
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     Starbucks. But we tell them there's enough to get a
     Starbucks or two.
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19
               THE COURT: That's about --
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               MR. BINGHAM: But that's the difference -- I would
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     suggest that if you're going to look at it like that, you
    have to also look at they're also paying $6 of the attorney's
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     fees. They're not -- none of them are paying the whole
23
    third. They're paying their pro rata share. So, yeah, okay.
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     I get $6.07, but I'm not paying for the litigation. Nobody
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paid the filing fees. Nobody is paying the lawyer. Nobody
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     is paying the administration cost. They're all paying their
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    pro rata share. No money is going back to Chase.
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               THE COURT: Let me ask you this: How many of these
     claimants would have returned this form had they known they
 5
     were getting $6.17?
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               MR. BINGHAM: You're saying the same format that --
               THE COURT: Sure.
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               MR. BINGHAM: Yeah, probably all of them.
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               THE COURT: You really think that.
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               MR. BINGHAM: Yeah, I really think so.
     interest in this case --
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               THE COURT: I would have thrown it away. How much
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     are the attorneys getting out of this compared to my $6.17?
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               MR. BINGHAM: We've had that discussion with
     numerous Class members, and when I say, okay, here is how it
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     works. You're only getting that much, but you're only paying
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    this much. You're paying a third, you know.
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               THE COURT: You should -- right now you can sit
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    down at the table and figure out a different number. While
     I'm talking to defense counsel, y'all need to sit down at the
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22
    table and figure out a different number to ask for.
23
               MR. BINGHAM: We'll do that.
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               THE COURT: Is that -- what about the Cy Pres?
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               MR. BINGHAM: There's been no opposition to the Cy
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I mentioned no money is going back to Chase.

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     when it's approved --.
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               THE COURT: And, again, I assume this is people
     who, even though they filed a claim, for some reason they
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     don't cash their check or they don't get their check.
 5
               MR. BINGHAM: Correct.
 6
 7
               THE COURT: And you can't track them down.
               MR. BINGHAM: Correct.
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               THE COURT: And there is a fund -- is there any
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     problem with -- it sounded like y'all worked out where those
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     funds should go. I didn't see any problem with that.
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               MR. BINGHAM: Okay. Yes, we worked that out, and
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     in part because another court had already approved those two
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     organizations.
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               THE COURT: Is there any concern from the plaintiff
     about that?
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               MR. BINGHAM: Not from the plaintiff. I think
     Mr. Cox has a problem.
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               THE COURT: Pardon me?
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               MR. BINGHAM: I think Mr. Cox has a problem, when
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     you get to him.
               THE COURT: I'll get to that. And as far as the
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     service payment to the Class representative? I mean, is
     that, does that seem to be a typical amount?
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               MR. BINGHAM: It's below any in this district in
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this type of case, yes, it's very typical.
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     negotiated with Chase.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
               MR. BINGHAM:
                             So.
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               THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Bingham.
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     I'll hear from Mr. Lewis now.
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               MR. BINGHAM:
                             Thank you.
               THE COURT: Mr. Levine or -- either Mr. Levine or
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    Mr. Lewis, whoever wants to go first. And, again, I will ask
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    you, since there no question about the notice, I'll ask you
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     to go through, and I'll just state them for the record.
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     different factors that the Court of Appeals, our Court of
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     Appeals looks at in determining the fairness of the
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     settlement, the existence of fraud or collusion behind the
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     settlement, the probability of the plaintiff's success on the
    merits, the range of possible recovery, and the complexity,
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     expense, and likely duration of the litigation, as stated,
    the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed, and
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     the opinions of Class counsel to Class representative and
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     absent Class members.
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                            Thank you, Your Honor. I think it's
               MR. LEVINE:
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    usually typical to let the plaintiffs do this because
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    understandably I think some judges think my job as the
    defense counsel is to negotiate the best deal I can get, you
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    know, for my client. And so you might not trust everything I
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have to say as much as the people who have the interest in representing the Class. But let me go through it and explain why we think, you know, we went in to negotiate. We had a hard-fraught negotiations with them. We would obviously prefer not to pay anything in these cases. But there's risk in all litigation. And especially in the statutes like the Consumer Protection Statutes, like the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the TCPA and those that have these statutory damages that can add up very quickly if you're multiplying because as a large financial institution you tend to engage in repetitive transactions. And so if there is a problem anywhere in your systems or anything like that, those can multiply quickly, and you have to take into account the risk of what's going to happen.
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Here, let me actually group together -- on the fraud and the collusion, there's no fraud or collusion here whatsoever. I think they've explained it well in their papers.

THE COURT: Did it actually settle in mediation or after mediation?

MR. LEVINE: It did. It settled in mediation.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEVINE: We had a settlement agreement in principal.

THE COURT: I understood that there were some

things y'all still did after mediation, but it actually settled in mediation?

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MR. LEVINE: We did. After the mediation, what had to happen is we had to draft up the agreement, for one. And they had to do a confirmatory discovery to figure out exactly, you know, as we drafted the agreement to confirm everything. But we had a settlement agreement in principal there. And, again, Judge Infante is one of the most respected mediators in this area, and he was absolutely instrumental to getting this done. I said as kind of an aside, when I was looking back at things in preparing for this hearing today, I went back through my notes of the mediation, and as I went through each step, you know, session one, session two, session three with the mediator, even though I lived through it, I didn't realize -- I didn't think we were going to get to a settlement looking at it, you know, knowing where we wanted to end up at the end of the day. I think he was really instrumental, and it was the definition of a good deal. You know, a good deal is something that we're not happy with necessarily at the end of the day, but we'll live with, and that's what happened here. So there was no fraud or collusion whatsoever.

In terms of the factors about the merits, the range of reasonable recovery, the complexity, the duration, those factors, I think they all basically go to the merits. And

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here we think we have a strong merits case. As he explained, there's no intent to do these pulls. These are complicated computer -- you know, computers run a lot of this stuff.

And, unfortunately, what we found, after, you know, the litigation came, was that there were some instances where it was getting pulled and they get repetitive. That said, the case law here is very favorable to us, and I think there were four things that were going to become very significant factors for them to litigate. We couldn't count on any one of those four, but they were very important.

The first was just the basic liability question. Under the FCRA, would they be able to prove that we aren't allowed to do a pull on an account of someone who was a customer, but who now asserts that they no longer have a credit relationship with the bank for a number of different reasons. And the Fifth Circuit case law says that there's -that the statute is ambiguous on that. But it doesn't say that you can't have access to credit reports. The Eleventh Circuit case which is -- then followed the Fifth Circuit case, that's the Levine case, said there where there were several pulls after the account was closed actually considered both the liability and the willfulness question. On the liability question, it said the statute was ambiguous. And then on willfulness said, therefore there's no willfulness liability. So we think on liability -- and then

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there have been more decisions, which Mr. Bingham alluded to, that have been decided more recently in district courts up in Wisconsin. I believe in Minnesota as well. They are cited in the plaintiff's brief. Those are the *Germain* case and the *Saumweber* case where they have said, you really have to look into exactly what is the nature of the relationship afterwards because when you're talking about mortgages there very well may be a security interest. And while the bank may not be allowed to go personally collect through a suit, they do still have the security interest that they can execute on. And does that constitute a credit relationship? It can. So that was first major obstacle.

The second major obstacle is willfulness because under the statute the only thing you get for proving a violation that isn't willful is actual damages. And this is the circumstance where there are no actual damages. These pulls don't show up on the credit reports at all. The only people who can see them on the credit report are the individual consumers themselves. But if they are applying for credit from somebody else and that person has permission to go look at the credit report to evaluate them for credit, they will not see that there had been any pull, in any one of these types of what we call soft pulls. So there were no damages here. So they really have to prove willfulness, and that's where everything comes down to in an FCRA case. And

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as I said, because the case law itself in the Court of Appeals says that the statute is ambiguous on this, that would be impossible under the Safe Code Decision we believe in the Supreme Court. Now is there a risk that for the reasons that Mr. Bingham said that we might not persuade a judge, there's always a risk I think in litigation. That's what we all know from our litigation careers. But we thought we had a very strong position there.

The third obstacle they were going to have to overcome was Class certification. And as I think they had said in their brief, there is no reported case of a certified Class in these circumstances where Class certification was contested. And indeed in the Germain case, although the district court ruled on summary judgment, the Court went on to say what it would have done on Class certification and why Class certification was inappropriate in a case like this. They would have had to overcome that.

And the last is the *Spokeo* case. We felt that things looked pretty good when the Court granted *Spokeo* because they had tried to reach this issue before. They hadn't been able to reach it. It wouldn't necessarily resolve the standing issue here. There are some differences between the claim in that case and this one. But it looked pretty good, and most of -- I think, as Mr. Bingham said, most of the consumer bar also was worried. I don't know what

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the current composition of the court now being eight members, whether we have that same optimism right now. The decision hasn't come down yet. But that said, we're talking about at a time when we were settling this case, you know, those were all major obstacles for them to overcome. That would have been a long, hard-fraught litigation to get through all of that for a claim that at the end of the day the only recovery is possibly — is it only possibly going to be the statutory damages.

So at the end of the day, we think in light of the range of reasonable recoveries, what they accomplished for the Class here was very good. And I think that the three things which really confirm why this settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, is, as they said, number one, they did -- we have agreed to a conduct provision here, which is addressed to the issue that came up in the litigation, and, that is, that we will have audits that are reasonably designed yearly for three years to ensure, not just to have the intent, but to ensure that none of these pulls are happening in these circumstances. That is a great value. Their expert, you know, I think acknowledges in his report that it's hard to put value on it. But it is -- whether you can put a monetary value on it at all, it's substantial. And conceptually it's very substantial because at the end of litigation they wouldn't have been able to get that.

is no injunctive relief under the FCRA, and this -- as many courts have held, including the Fifth Circuit.

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The second reason, fair, reasonable, and adequate is the monetary relief. And I take to heart your questions about the \$6.17 if they were to get 33 percent of the attorney's fees. But in this circumstance, that is -- first of all, that is real money. Second of all, we'll have to evaluate it against the range of a reasonable recovery and against the type of injury, which is alleged here. And this is one where there is no economic damage, no economic harm. And for that reason, and given all of the hurdles they would have had to overcome, that compares very favorably.

In fact, it really gets to the heart of what Rule 23 is about. Rule 23 is about having a system in which you can put together these types of small claims to be litigated. So I think the Class settlement here actually demonstrates that Rule 23 is working the way it's supposed to. It does compare favorably to other settlements. As they pointed out, in the account review world, under these provisions of the FCRA, there has only ever been one other settlement in which there was any monetary relief whatsoever. And very frequently no injunctive relief either. This one gets both. And it gets the monetary relief. It compares very favorably with the TCPA settlement. And, if anything, the reason that, you know, \$6 might be lower than might -- what it might

have otherwise have been--.

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THE COURT: Why are you defending their attorney's fees?

MR. LEVINE: I'm not. I'm not defending any of their attorney's fees. I was -- I have an agreement that I cannot object to them, but I was just getting to your comment about is \$6 worth, because you said you would have thrown it away. So I just wanted to make sure to address that as an issue.

THE COURT: I know. But that was based on the amount of attorney's fees they're requesting.

MR. LEVINE: Okay. Well, I just wanted to address the \$6. That was it.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEVINE: And then the final thing, the reason why, you know, it's really been shown to be fair, reasonable, and adequate is that there — the response has been tremendous. In all of these, you know — I defend Class actions quite a bit, and the response rate is very good here. And, in fact, you compare the very few people who wanted to exclude themselves from this settlement compared to the number that wanted to participate, and compare it to the very few number of objections. And, frankly, the objections that were received, you know, weren't all that substantial, you know, including the lawyered ones. You know, they were

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pretty much boilerplate. They were just kind of sentences you could have taken out of the same person's objections in other cases. And I think -- so for all those reasons, I think it is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

In terms of the stage of the case at which this settled, I think this, as this Court knows, we were all encouraged us to talk about ADR early, and we took that seriously. They served their discovery on us. We provided them with the documents that they needed to know. provided them with a corporate representative deposition. They took that deposition. They asked us questions all during this process to find out things that they needed to So in light of all of the hurdles that they would have had to overcome, and the fact that they could have lost the case, had they pushed the case through any one of those hurdles -- and this is one of those situations I always say as a defendant, I need to win at one of those four hurdles. They need to win at all four. And if they lose at any one of those, the case could be over for everyone. And, frankly, the order matters. If they lose on the merits after they lose the Class certification, that means the Class has a judgment against them for zero. I think it was wise to do what they did at this time. And I think, you know, we wanted to explore it, and if it was possible, we would reach it and we did.

The last factor I can't do because that's the opinions of Class counsel, but they've given you their opinion on that, so I'm happy to answer any questions the Court may have.

THE COURT: And the -- and as the Class representative, payment, you're okay with?

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MR. LEVINE: Okay with both. And on the Cy Pres, I would say, on top of everything else, this only is going to come up if there happens to be an uncashed check, you know, and to the extent that there are those uncashed checks. So where there are issues in cases with Cy Pres, those are ones where, you know, they're designating like a million dollars for a Cy Pres or something like that. This is really out of practical necessity. There needs to be a Cy Pres here just because there could be some uncashed checks, and it won't be economical to send them out again. We designed the Cy Pres with them based on another — based on a TCPA settlement to go to organizations that really help people like the Class. There are good programs for, you know, credit counseling, things like that, so, yeah, we have no problem with that.

THE COURT: Well, and if the rate, whatever the rate is going to be, we are not talking about significant checks here. Did counsel happen to make some rough estimate about what a Cy Pres fund might look like in this case?

MR. LEVINE: I don't think we have because we

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always knew it would really only get down to as long as we have the healthy claims rate that they wanted, it would only get down to the uncashed checks, and so I don't think we have ever looked at, you know, how much do we expect, what the projected uncashed check rate. I don't think we have. But we're happy to make sure that that — it's important for them, and I would assume it would be important for the Court in approving any settlement, that that money not come back to my client. So it's important for it to go out to someone that would benefit the Class, and we're good with that.

THE COURT: Is there a rough percentage of claimants that do not get their checks in Class actions, and maybe the plaintiffs are best to answer that. But just so that I'm -- have some idea in my head what number we're talking about.

MR. LEVINE: There, maybe we could certainly ask the settlement administrator. My guess is that it varies tremendously.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEVINE: The settlement administrator will probably tell us, well, it depends on this factor, this factor. You could use this, you could use this. But I don't see it being that much here. I mean, I think it's going to be really well, well, under 1 percent is my guess.

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THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, sir.
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               MR. LEVINE: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT:
                          Mr. Lewis, do you have anything to add?
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               MR. LEWIS:
                          Nothing to add, Judge.
                          Okay. Does the plaintiff want to add
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               THE COURT:
     anything before I take the objections?
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               MR. BINGHAM:
                            We're taking your suggestion to
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     heart, but I was hoping maybe there would be a little break
     where the counsel could talk about the fee.
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               THE COURT: Well, then I'll go ahead and take the
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     objections at this time.
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               MR. BINGHAM: Thank you.
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               THE COURT: Ms. Lewis, if you would come forward,
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    please, ma'am.
                    Ms. Lewis, the summary I have of your
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     objection is that Chase foreclosed on your condominium
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     causing you to become homeless and that you do not believe
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     this settlement is sufficient to compensate you for your
     losses?
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               MS. LEWIS: Yes.
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               THE COURT: Is there anything else that you
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     wanted -- you're welcome to say anything else you had.
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     you understand that to object to the settlement--
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               MS. LEWIS: Uh-hum.
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               THE COURT: -- the settlement would allow you -- I
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    mean, if you're a member of the Class, and I assume you are a
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member of the Class, you can recover actual damages if you
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     can prove that you lost your -- that your condominium was
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     foreclosed on because of what Chase did. Okay.
                          Well, basically what I have.
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               MS. LEWIS:
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                          Well, let me finish.
               THE COURT:
               MS. LEWIS:
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                          Okay.
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               THE COURT: If you can prove that what Chase did in
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     this case.
               MS. LEWIS: Uh-hum.
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               THE COURT: Not because of something else Chase
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     did.
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               MS. LEWIS: Uh-hum.
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               THE COURT: But by looking into your file after it
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     was closed.
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               MS. LEWIS: Uh-hum.
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               THE COURT: That caused them to foreclose on your
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     condominium.
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               MS. LEWIS: Uh-hum.
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               THE COURT: Now if they look into your file while
20
     it was still open, that doesn't count. You understand that?
21
     Do you understand that?
22
               MS. LEWIS: No, no, I do not.
23
               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
24
                          No, I do not. No.
               MS. LEWIS:
25
               THE COURT:
                          Okay. Okay.
                                         This only applies to
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people whose accounts were closed by Chase.
 1
 2
               MS. LEWIS:
                           Uh-hum.
 3
               THE COURT: And then Chase continued to look into
     their files afterwards when they may not have had a right to
 4
 5
               Now, if they looked into your file while your file
     do that.
     was still open at Chase, technically, I'm not sure you should
6
 7
     be a member of the Class.
 8
               MS. LEWIS:
                          Well, Your Honor, I did get a card.
 9
               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
10
               MS. LEWIS: I did get a card, and I do not
11
     understand it.
               THE COURT:
12
                          Okay.
13
               MS. LEWIS:
                           That's why I'm here.
                          Okay. Well, let's try it again.
14
               THE COURT:
15
                           That's why I'm here because of the fact
               MS. LEWIS:
16
    that I did not understand the purpose of why I was part of
     this Class. Second of all, I am homeless. I do have
17
     information regarding the foreclosure of my condo in Oak
18
19
    Park. It's not in Chicago. In Oak Park, Illinois. I have
20
     all of that information with me today in this court because
     of the fact I did not understand.
21
22
                          Well, let's get it straightened out.
               THE COURT:
23
               MS. LEWIS: And I also have the--
               THE COURT:
24
                          Okay.
25
               MS. LEWIS: -- I have information stating I am
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```
living on the streets in Illinois.
 1
                           Well, let's get it straightened out.
 2
               THE COURT:
 3
               MS. LEWIS:
                           Okay.
               THE COURT: Mr. Bingham, why would -- if her -- if
 4
 5
     she was foreclosed on through Chase, I would assume she still
     had an open account at Chase.
 6
 7
               MS. LEWIS: Right. That's what I'm thinking too.
               THE COURT: Then why would she be a member of the
 8
     Class?
 9
10
               MR. BINGHAM: She received a postcard notice.
11
     she also sent to us a letter, which indicated that Chase had
12
     forgiven the indebtedness resulting from the foreclosure.
13
     They had issued her a 1099-dash something IRS form, which is
14
     a debt forgiveness form, which means she did not owe Chase
15
     the money, and that's why she is in the Class. Chase
16
     foreclosed, but there's no deficiency left.
               THE COURT: Well, tell me again.
17
               MR. BINGHAM: Well, there was, but it was.
18
19
               MS. LEWIS: It's--
20
               (Cross-talking.)
21
               THE COURT: Just a minute -- just a second,
22
     Ms. Lewis.
23
               MS. LEWIS: The deficiency was $7,000. Go ahead.
24
     Okay.
25
               THE COURT:
                           Tell me again.
```

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```
Chase foreclosed on her condominium.
               MR. BINGHAM:
 1
 2
               THE COURT: Yes.
 3
               MR. BINGHAM:
                             There was a--.
 4
               THE COURT: There was still an amount outstanding?
 5
               MR. BINGHAM:
                             There was an amount outstanding, but
     then Chase issued this IRS form 1099 something.
                                                       Ms. Lewis
 6
 7
     sent it to me.
               THE COURT:
                          Okay.
 8
 9
               MR. BINGHAM: May I look at it?
10
               MS. LEWIS: Yes, it's here. I put it back here.
11
     And this is back in the back, but I do have it with me.
12
    back there somewhere.
13
                            Well, so Chase foreclosed on the
               MR. BINGHAM:
14
    home, the condo, and then there was a deficiency owing, and I
15
     talked at length with Ms. Lewis, and I couldn't figure out --
16
     it sounded to me like Chase was trying to collect from her.
     And she shouldn't be in the Class in that case. But, you
17
    know, one of those in the shower thoughts, made me think is
18
19
     what she was talking about was a Form 1099 forgiveness of
    debt form.
20
21
               THE COURT: Erased her debt.
               MR. BINGHAM: So we called her and asked her if
22
23
     what she got from Chase had 1099 on it, and it did.
               THE COURT: Okay.
2.4
25
               MR. BINGHAM: And so Chase has forgiven -- it's
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either 53 -- I think the amount is 53,900 and 698.82.
 1
 2
     forgave that amount.
 3
               THE COURT:
                          Okay.
               MR. BINGHAM: So she doesn't owe Chase. But she
 4
 5
     still got her credit report pulled.
               THE COURT: Okay. Now -- and so at some point
 6
 7
     after that she qualifies to become a member of the Class
 8
     because after that her file was pulled and Chase looked at
     it?
 9
10
               MR. BINGHAM:
                             That's correct.
11
               THE COURT: Okay.
12
               MR. BINGHAM: That's correct.
13
               THE COURT: Ms. Lewis, you are a member of the
14
    Class, and you're entitled to receive a portion of the
15
     settlement. But your foreclosure had nothing to do with what
     is being alleged in this lawsuit. Therefore, what -- and I
16
17
    have no idea about the circumstances of your foreclosure, but
     your foreclosure occurred while you had an active account at
18
19
    Chase Bank. And what Chase did in this lawsuit occurred
20
     after you had no active account at Chase Bank. Therefore,
21
    there's no way that you can be compensated in this lawsuit
2.2
     for the foreclosure.
23
               MS. LEWIS: Okay. I just wanted to know exactly
    what was going on.
2.4
2.5
               THE COURT: And that's -- that's all I can tell
```

you. Is that nothing that happened when you had an active account at Chase can be compensated by anything in this lawsuit. And so the -- so if you have any claim against Chase, it would have to be done through a separate, separate litigation, separate claim, but it cannot be done through this lawsuit.

MS. LEWIS: Okay. Because I was just wanting to know because like you said earlier, \$6 and 90 some cents for me is not going to do -- it's not going to do anything for me.

THE COURT: No, of course not, not as far as foreclosure.

(Cross-talking.)

2.4

MS. LEWIS: You know, because of the fact that I am living on the streets. I am homeless. And part of that — even though I know you said it doesn't have anything to do with it, but throughout the foreclosure, throughout those proceedings, they kept pulling my credit, and it kept asking me about credit rights, which I did not understand whatsoever. So that's why I came here today with nothing in my pocket, but I came here because I wanted to know exactly what was going on.

THE COURT: Well, and you are entitled to consult with a lawyer about what happened during your foreclosure, but that is separate from what we're talking about in this

```
lawsuit.
 1
 2
               MS. LEWIS:
                           Okay.
 3
               THE COURT:
                          Thank you, Ms. Lewis, for being here.
               MS. LEWIS: You're welcome.
 4
 5
               THE COURT:
                          Mr. Lam. I do not have a summary of
     your objection, sir. When did you file an objection?
6
 7
               MR. BINGHAM: Your Honor, he did not file an
 8
     objection. He just showed up for the hearing today, and I
 9
     don't know if he's actually got anything. He's just
10
     attending.
11
               THE COURT: Oh, you're just attending?
12
               MR. LAM: Yes.
13
               THE COURT: Oh, okay. That's fine.
14
               Sorry, sir, I didn't mean to scare you.
15
     have a Basilio and Janie Tijerina, but I don't have any
    notice of an objection from them.
16
17
               MR. BINGHAM: Same situation.
               THE COURT: They're just here to observe?
18
19
               MR. BINGHAM: Yes.
20
               THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. Mr. Cox.
21
               MR. COX: Your Honor, may I approach to give the
22
     court reporter my name and phone number?
23
               THE COURT: Sure, that's fine. And I do have
    everything you have done in writing, so you don't need to
2.4
2.5
    repeat everything that you have submitted before, but you're
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```
welcome to tell me whatever you would like.
 1
 2
               MR. COX:
                         I don't intend to repeat what I've said
 3
              One of the things I do want to do is respond to the
     personal attack that Mr. Bingham launched against me. And
 4
 5
     specifically I have great offense at Docket 62, Page 89,
     where they imply that every case I've objected in I've filed
6
 7
     an appeal and never written a brief. Approximately, almost
 8
     half of the cases they cite in there, nothing was done but to
 9
     file an objection at the district court. No appeal was
10
             In particular, the one case they list In re Mutual
11
     Funds, no appeal was taken. They state no briefs have ever
12
    been filed. Four briefs were filed with the appellate court,
13
    particularly to Country Wide, Lividia, and Forever v.
14
     Batement. And a brief was filed in Dewey v. Volkswagen, but
15
     my name was not on it.
16
               THE COURT: I'm really more concerned about your
17
     objection to this settlement, Mr. Cox.
               MR. COX: I understand that, but I don't want the
18
19
    Court to think --
20
               THE COURT: I'm not judging you based on what
21
    happened--
22
               MR. COX: Okay.
23
               THE COURT: -- in other cases.
               MR. COX: All right.
24
25
                           I mean, that's not as much my concern.
               THE COURT:
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What my concern is, is what objection do you have to this
 1
 2
     settlement?
 3
               MR. COX: It probably goes back to what somebody
 4
     said earlier, and you may have said it, was there a rush to
     settlement. And I believe Mr. Bandas, in his objection noted
 5
     that. And when you kill a case early on with an attorney's
6
 7
     fees agreement, that raises a question. And that's what,
     really, we have here, was we suggested you use the Lodestar
 8
 9
     crosscheck against what they're saying that they've done.
10
               And, secondly, they have provided me all the
11
     documents, which is very courteous of them. But I don't
12
     recall seeing any detailed time sheets. I think without
     detailed time sheets, you really can't support their fee
13
14
    based on an affidavit that said we spent this many hours.
                                                                 So
     that's why I would say that there's a real problem there
15
     without the time sheets showing what work was done and what
16
17
     exactly it was done for. And if they have been filed, I
    didn't see them, and I apologize to the Court, if they have
18
19
     been filed. But I just haven't seen them.
20
               THE COURT: And you're talking about attorney's
21
     fees?
22
               MR. COX: Attorneys' fees.
23
               THE COURT: Is that your main complaint?
                        That's the main complaint.
24
               MR. COX:
25
               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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MR. COX: I raised the Cy Pres issue, but at the time the notice went out, they were not specified. They have specified them since then. THE COURT: Okay. And I wouldn't have picked them, but, you MR. COX: know, that's not my call. THE COURT: Okay. And I don't know that there's going to be that big of a fund into that anyway. MR. COX: The only thing else I would say on the Cy Pres issue is sometimes the law firms involved in the cases will have a highest to the recipients. It doesn't appear from what they have said how they came to determine these people, do we have any problem that they, you know, somebody's wife is the director or an employee of one of these agencies. I don't think that exists here. THE COURT: Okay. MR. COX: So that is really all I had was just to question the attorney's fees. And I do -- and I don't recall off the top of my head whether it was one third in expenses or one third less expenses. THE COURT: I think they were asking for one third including expenses.

MR. COX: Okay. I wasn't sure. But that's -- I wanted to just bring that to the Court's attention to make sure that's what in fact what it is.

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THE COURT: Yes, sir. And I think they said their
 1
 2
     expenses were at this point 23,000.
 3
                        Well, what about the administrative
               MR. COX:
     expenses? Those are going to be borne by the Class then?
 4
 5
               THE COURT: Does that come out of the 8.75 as well?
               MR. COX: I believe so.
 6
 7
               THE COURT: Mr. Bingham?
               MR. BINGHAM: Yes, Your Honor, it does.
 8
 9
               THE COURT: And how much -- approximately how much
10
     are those?
               MR. BINGHAM: Those are about 2.9 because we've got
11
12
     the Class notice. That's how we get to the six, $6.17.
13
               THE COURT: Okay. So it's administrative expenses
     of 2.9 million?
14
15
               MR. BINGHAM: Right. The -- that's primarily due
16
     to the fact that we sent out the notices. We prepaid for the
17
     return claims by business reply mail. The only case I've
     seen that's like ours, they didn't do that. But they only
18
19
     got a 5 percent claim rate. So, in my opinion, prepaid and
20
     postage made a huge difference in this case. Now, we have to
     mail out checks, so we've got three big tranches of postage.
21
22
     And the more claims we have, the higher the cost is.
23
               THE COURT: Okay. I just wanted to ask that. Go
     ahead, Mr. Cox.
24
25
               MR. COX: And the only thing I would say on that,
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you would have to consider that -- lump that together with
 1
 2
     the attorneys' fees. As a percentage, is that reasonable?
 3
     And I think they have to be included that there's case law to
     that effect. That's all I've got, Your Honor.
 4
 5
               THE COURT: Thank you, sir.
               Mr. Bingham, let me just clarify, then, you're
 6
 7
     talking about taking as far as attorney's fees, one third of
     the 8.7 million -- 7.5 million?
 8
 9
               MR. BINGHAM: We are saying that, but we're saying
10
     the value is 22 million. We're saying the value of the
11
     settlement is 22 million. The cash plus the injunctive
12
     relief. So we're taking 13 percent of the value of the
13
     settlement, which is -- but also one third of the cash.
14
               THE COURT: You're -- run that by me again.
15
               MR. BINGHAM: Okay. In our papers, the -- our
     expert, who is present here today, values the injunctive
16
17
     relief, the change of practice and the educational benefit of
18
     this at $13.2 million. So you add the cash plus the value of
19
     the injunctive relief, and it comes up to a number just shy
     of $22 million.
20
21
               THE COURT: And how do you value it at
2.2
     $13.2 million?
23
               MR. BINGHAM: He valued it at $1 per Class member
     for the educational benefit, so that's 2.2 million.
24
25
               THE COURT: An educational benefit?
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MR. BINGHAM: Right.

2.4

THE COURT: How did they get an educational benefit from this?

MR. BINGHAM: Well, as I mentioned, they get the Class notice. They see that there's a claim under the FCRA for a creditor conducting their account reviews, and now they know about a claim that they didn't know about before, and countless people have told us that. They've called and said: I appreciate that because either Chase or they have other creditors doing it. They say, I didn't know it was a claim.

Now I do. I didn't know I could do it but -- something about it, now I do. So there's that benefit, just becoming aware of a claim they did not know about before.

And our expert, who is the nation's primary privacy expert, he's testified in Congress ten times on these kind of issues. He says it's worth a dollar a person for that benefit at \$3 -- or \$5 over a three-year period for the change of practice that Chase has agreed to implement despite having no obligation to do so and despite the FCRA not having injunctive relief in the Fifth Circuit at least.

So the change of practice and the educational benefit, when you total that up times the 2.2 Class members, you get the \$13.2 million. Add that to the 8.75, there's the \$22 million settlement, and a third of the cash computes to about 13 percent for attorneys' fees and administrative fees.

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THE COURT: Do you have -- can you cite to any other case where those kind of numbers have been plugged in by an expert? MR. BINGHAM: Well, yes, there's--. THE COURT: Did you put that in your brief? It's in our briefing. The latest one MR. BINGHAM: is this case in the Fourth Circuit. It's pure injunctive relief. The court values it. THE COURT: No, I mean where there was actually a find plus injunctive relief where they actually added money because of the injunctive relief. MR. BINGHAM: I can't think of a case -- the De Hoyos case v. All State that Judge Biery did. I can't remember -- I can't remember. I know it was primarily injunctive relief. I can't remember if there was a cash component. But the case out of the Fourth Circuit is Berry  $v.\ B-E-R-R-Y\ v.\ Shulman.$  And there's two subclasses, and one subclass got some money. But the bulk of the opinion is the value of the injunctive relief, is it proper to award attorneys' fees on injunctive relief. If there's no injunctive relief under the FCRA, can a creditor agree to it, and does that confirm that value on the Class. And that case

And I think there's one called -- it's also in the briefing. I think -- I don't know how to pronounce it.

cites lots of FCRA cases where the only relief is injunction.

2.4

2.5

Something like Chajikin, C-H-A-J-I-K-I-N, or something like that. That is primarily -- it has some cash, but it's primarily injunctive relief also.

THE COURT: Is there anything else either side would like to comment on regarding the matters that we're here for today?

MR. RILEY: Your Honor, we'd like to get back with you on attorney's fees.

THE COURT: You can do it by an advisory because it's going to take -- I'm going to be gone for the next few days, and you can do it by Monday next week. Just file an advisory.

MR. RILEY: I'd like to make a few comments about attorney fees, Your Honor, if you don't mind.

THE COURT: Yes, sir, go right ahead.

MR. RILEY: I think I would like to just point out that the contingency fee attorney business is a high risk business, and lot of times they come out with nothing. The courts and Congress want to encourage the enforcement of the FCRA and these kinds of statutes. Very few lawyers know about these statutes. Very few have heard of a soft pull. And it was fortuitous that this case was brought at all.

Ms. Duncan was — happened to be able to read a credit report, read her own credit report, see what was going on, and complain about it, find the right attorney who happened

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to know the right attorney, Bingham and Hervol having filed
 1
     this same Class action in this court five years ago for the
 2
 3
     exact same violation. This is almost unique in the country.
 4
     It's a very, almost a weird circumstance that came together,
     so I think those things along with the tremendous amount of
 5
     work involved in this, for example the calls that we get are
 6
 7
     from people who have other beefs with Chase. And so we're
 8
     going to continue to get those as well, Your Honor. And so
 9
     they have foreclosure problems and other things, and they get
10
     confused as to what's involved here. So this is just some
11
     other factors concerning attorney fees.
12
               THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Riley. Anything else
13
     from either side?
14
               MR. BINGHAM:
                            No, Your Honor.
15
               MR. LEVINE: No, Your Honor.
16
               THE COURT: Okay. I will enter a recommendation.
17
     If you do have an advisory to make, please file it by Monday,
     and I will submit a recommendation to Judge Biery, and both
18
19
     sides will have an opportunity to respond to that. The court
20
     is in recess.
21
               THE COURT SECURITY OFFICER: All rise.
22
               (Adjournment.)
23
2.4
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-000-I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter. I further certify that the transcript fees and format comply with those prescribed by the Court and the Judicial Conference of the United States. Date signed: August 29, 2016. /s/ Leticia Rangel LETICIA RANGEL United States Court Reporter P.O. Box 831751 San Antonio, Texas 78204 (512)550-6886